Can economic incentives be used to affect marriage behavior and slow the growth of single-parent families? This paper provides new evidence on the effects of welfare benefit incentives on the marital decisions of poor women. Exogenous variation in welfare program parameters arises from a randomized experiment carried out in California. Whereas previous studies have measured women's responses to year-to-year changes in welfare benefit changes, I am able to measure responses over longer periods of time. The analysis recognizes that married women can receive AFDC benefits under some circumstances, and distinguishes between transitions into marriage and transitions out of marriage. I find that a regime of lower benefits and stronger work incentives encourages married aid recipients to stay married, but has little effect on the probability that single-parent aid recipients marry. The effects on married recipients become larger over time, suggesting that long-run effects may exist. This motivation presumes that female headship is the cause of poverty, and that it is not other characteristics 1 of women who become female heads that causes them to be poor.
I. Introduction
"The decline of the American family" has been a catch-phrase applied to a variety of demographic trends in recent decades. The trend that is probably most responsible for this view is the increasing prevalence of families headed by unmarried women. The proportion of children living with only one parent increased from 12 percent in 1970 to 28 percent in 1996 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1997a). Female headship is of interest to economists because it is highly correlated with poverty: the poverty rate for female-headed families was 33 percent in 1996 compared to just 6 percent for marriedcouple families (U.S. Department of Commerce 1997b). Thus, two avenues that policymakers have taken to reduce poverty are to discourage women from having children out of wedlock and to encourage couples to stay married. A central policy concern is whether economic incentives can be used 1 effectively toward these ends.
Scholars and politicians alike have assumed that economic incentives matter, often blaming the welfare system for contributing to the rise in female headship. The main cash welfare program available to poor families with children-Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)-was explicitly created to give benefits to single parents with children under age 18. Because benefits are conditioned on marital status, opponents of the welfare system have long argued that the system discourages marriage and encourages divorce. Although there is no doubt about the existence of these incentives, there has been continued disagreement over the degree to which the incentives actually affect behavior of individuals in an adverse way. The comprehensive welfare reform of 1996 gave states much flexibility to customize their welfare programs to succeed the now-defunct AFDC program; these programs, now called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), retain their emphasis on singleparent poverty. As individual states take greater advantage of their new freedom to change the welfare laws in the future, they will increasingly grapple with at least two questions. First, how can economic The assignment to control and treatment groups was stratified based on pre-experiment income. Moffitt and 2 Kehrer (1981) point out that serial correlation in, say, labor supply error terms may result in the treatment variable being correlated with unobserved heterogeneity and hence subject to simultaneity bias. Moffitt (1992) points out that the treatment group members were issued benefit checks automatically if they 3 were eligible, thus resulting in a 100 percent takeup rate. In contrast, control group members had the choice of not applying for AFDC benefits. Michel (1980) estimates an AFDC takeup rate of only 69 percent in 1970. Treatment group members were also required to file income and family composition reports every month instead of every four months for the control group.
-2-incentives be used to change family structure in "desirable" ways? Second, will changes in the relative size of single-parent and two-parent welfare benefit entitlements have unintended consequences for family stability? This study aims to provide some basis for answering these policy questions. Moffitt's (1997) review of the literature on welfare's effects on family structure indicates that there is not a uniform set of findings across studies. While there are more studies that find a significant effect of welfare benefits than there are that find no significant effect, no consensus about the size of the effect has emerged due to the problems of inference based on either cross-state comparisons or withinstate, over-time comparisons. A further difficulty with within-state, over-time comparisons is that they are generally able to identify only welfare effects that operate within one year, not longer-term responses (Moffitt 1994) .
Given these problems, it is useful to draw upon evidence from social experiments when available. One important set of experiments was the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (SIME-DIME). These experiments provided a variety of benefit schemes applicable to married couples. A number of scholars have taken issue with the results of the experiments, on the basis of either the randomization design or the nature of the treatment itself . For these and many other 2 3 reasons, scholars still disagree over what conclusions may be drawn from these experiments about the effects of income guarantees on marriage and divorce (see Cain and Wissoker (1990) and Hannan and Tuma (1990) ).
This study avoids the difficulties of previous empirical studies in two major ways: (i) the source of variation in welfare benefits is a social experiment with simple random assignment and (ii) repeated I will use the term AFDC here to also refer to TANF, since the incentives are basically unchanged and the 4 data in this study come from the pre-welfare reform era.
-3-observations on the treatment and control groups allows me to distinguish between short-term and longterm effects of changes in welfare benefits. In contrast to many prior studies, I also distinguish between welfare's effects on marriage formation versus marital dissolution. This distinction is achieved by analyzing the effects of program changes separately for women who began the study period in the singleparent AFDC-Basic program and for women initially in the two-parent AFDC-UP (Unemployed Parent) program.
The evidence provided in this paper shows that welfare program incentives do affect poor women's marriage decisions. The evidence suggests that stronger work incentives (from a combination of lower welfare benefits and lower benefit reduction rates) significantly increase marital stability for poor two-parent families. These effects are larger the longer a woman is in such a benefit regime. There is no evidence that this treatment either encourages or discourages marriage among single-parent welfare recipients. The next section describes the incentives of the AFDC program, section 3 describes the data and the social experiment in California, section 4 explains the empirical results, and the last section concludes.
II. Marriage and Cohabitation Incentives of the AFDC Program
The standard description of the AFDC program is the following: AFDC is primarily available 4 only to single-parent families, therefore increases in AFDC benefit levels lead to a decrease in the likelihood of being married. Yet the true pattern of incentives is more complicated. In particular, two important considerations render even the direction of the benefit level's effect on marriage ambiguous:
(i) AFDC benefits are available to married couples, and (ii) we cannot predict how couples allocate consumption or income between individuals. The first consideration means that a broad increase in the benefit level will increase income opportunities for women both in the married state and in the Studies that do recognize AFDC-UP typically add a dummy variable indicating whether AFDC-UP is 5 available in a given state in a given year. This simple specification should not be expected to capture the true incentive effects discussed in this section.
I have found no systematic survey of state changes to AFDC-UP. The pre-reform program is likely to serve 6 as the benchmark for many states' new programs.
Significant attachment is defined as having worked and earned at least $50 in at least six of the previous 7 thirteen calendar quarters, or having been eligible for unemployment compensation benefits during the previous year.
The 1996 welfare reform allowed states to establish different benefit schedules in the two programs, a policy 8 option I will discuss more in the conclusion of the paper.
-4-unmarried state. The second consideration implies that we cannot determine a priori the relative magnitude of the marginal utility of AFDC benefits for married women versus for single women.
Most studies of the AFDC system's effects on marriage do not recognize that AFDC benefits are in fact available to two-parent families through the AFDC-UP program. Before the 1996 welfare 5 reform, AFDC-UP applied the following rules. Eligibility in the UP program is conditioned on the 6 primary earner having a significant attachment to the labor force and working fewer than 100 hours per 7 month. Total family income must meet the same income cutoffs as under the single parent "AFDCBasic" program. Benefit levels are the same in both components of the AFDC program , where an 8 AFDC-UP family with 2 adults and 2 kids receives benefits applicable to an AFDC-Basic family with 1 parent and 3 kids. In some cases, a poor couple may be eligible for more benefits if they marry (and receive AFDC-UP) than if they remain separate (and the woman receives AFDC-Basic). The supposed marriage-discouraging effect of AFDC may thus work in the opposite direction.
Understanding the incentives of AFDC becomes even more complicated because marriage is treated differently depending on whether the male partner is the father of the children, and because marriage is treated differently from cohabitation. An AFDC-Basic recipient is allowed to cohabit with a partner as long as the spouse/partner is not the parent of the woman's children. If a cohabiting male is the father, then the household may only receive AFDC under the AFDC-UP program. Furthermore, marriage rather than cohabitation is penalized if a woman marries a male who is not the parent of the This rule applies in all but seven states. See Moffitt, Reville, and Winkler (1994) .
9
-5-children; in this case, a portion of the male's income is counted as part of household income and thus makes the household eligible for lower benefit payments. In the case of cohabiting, non-parent males, 9 some states reduce AFDC benefits depending on the contribution of the male to shared expenses. In California, no benefit reduction is made regardless of shared expenses by cohabitors (see Moffitt, Reville, and Winkler's 1994 survey of state rules on cohabitors). As shown by Moffitt, Reville, and Winkler (1995) , a substantial fraction of AFDC recipients are married-a proportion too large to be accounted for by AFDC-UP recipients. In the empirical analysis, I will distinguish between welfare's effects on marriage and effects on cohabitation, because the ultimate well-being of children may differ between these two types of living arrangements, either due to a differing level of commitment between spouses or due to different levels of expenditures on children.
The combination of these two lesser-known aspects of AFDC benefit rules can be illustrated with a more concrete example. Suppose a woman with two children and zero earnings is contemplating marrying or cohabiting with a male partner. Then the benefits available can be summarized according to the following table, with benefit levels corresponding to California: In California, the maximum monthly benefit is $607 for a family of three and $723 for a family of four. The table most importantly shows that the incentive to stay single is not invariant to the relationship of the male to the children and to the income of the male, as seen by comparing case (1) to either case (3) or case (4). In some cases, welfare payments may actually increase due to marriage.
Note also that the incentives against marriage may be affected both by the absolute level of benefits (cases (3) and (4)) and by the relative size of benefits between the two parts of the AFDC program (case (1)).
Although the incentives seen in Table 1 are complicated, they also present a potentially rich set of testable implications with which to confront the data. As a practical matter, however, it is impossible to know with much confidence which of the four rows above pertain most to a particular woman's choice, since one cannot adequately define the potential set of spouses or cohabitors. In the empirical work to follow, I will attempt to determine whether marriage behavior responds to the differential treatment of parents and non-parents. For the moment, it should be clear that the sign of the coefficient on welfare benefits in a marriage regression equation is a priori ambiguous and does not tell us the size Food Stamps and Supplemental Security Income do not have important marriage incentives, other than the 10 incentive to be poor (in both programs) or to have a larger family size (for Food Stamps).
Responses to incentives also depend on the extent to which welfare recipients can misreport their marital 11 status or living arrangements. Those who can engage in this kind of fraud costlessly should have no response to increases in benefit levels.
-7-of the effect of changing opportunities only in the unmarried state, as most researchers have assumed.
In the discussion above, I have also ignored other income maintenance programs such as General Assistance (GA) and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). A poor male who chooses to get married 10 may lose benefits under GA (up to approximately $200 per month in California), thus increasing the incentive to stay single. On the other hand, the EITC may be a powerful incentive for marriage. If a male has low earnings and the female does not work, then the couple can qualify for EITC payments (up to $3,556 per year in 1996 for two-children families) only if the male claims the children as dependents.
In this case, it may be income-maximizing to be married and collect both EITC and AFDC-UP benefits.
In the empirical work to follow, I do not explicitly consider the interactions of AFDC with other programs; the experimental design of the dataset allows me to isolate the effect of AFDC program changes holding other program parameters constant.
It is appropriate to ask whether there is in fact any overlap between the AFDC-Basic and the AFDC-UP populations to support the complicated discussion of incentives above. In the data I will describe in the next section, 3 percent of women who start out as AFDC-Basic cases eventually use AFDC-UP at some point within a 2½-year time frame, and 27 percent of initially AFDC-UP women eventually use AFDC-Basic in that time frame. Thus, it is not unreasonable to expect some women to respond to the incentives I have described, because they actually experience benefits under both programs.
11

III. Data: The California Welfare Experiment
Beginning in December 1992, the state of California, under its waiver agreement with the federal Prior to this change, the $30 disregard applied only for the first twelve months of AFDC recipiency, and the 12 67 percent tax rate rose to 100 percent after four months of recipiency. Thus, the change meant that welfare benefit calculations did not change over the length of a spell.
This sample thus is disproportionately composed of long-term AFDC recipients, a group that is more likely 13 than the average person in the general population to respond to welfare benefit changes but perhaps less likely than the average AFDC entrant to respond to economic incentives.
-8-government, began conducting a social experiment with its AFDC program. The main changes in the welfare system were intended to increase work incentives for the treatment group: maximum benefit levels were decreased and, for those recipients in spells lasting longer than four months, the benefit reduction rate was reduced from 100 percent to 67 percent. In addition, the treatment extended the $30 randomly assigned one-third of these cases to a control group. The treatment cases were subject to the new benefit rules, whereas the control cases were subject to the pre-reform rules. Cases that left AFDC and subsequently returned retained their original control-treatment status. The benefit levels under the experiment are shown below in Table 2 . (Although the treatment group received two separate benefit cuts, I have marital status data only for the period following the second cut.)
The need standard (NS) affects benefits in the following way. Benefits paid are equal to max [0, min{B, t×earnings}], where B is the maximum monthly benefit and t is the benefit reduction rate. In many states, B and NS are identical; in California, NS>B.
-9- Other changes in the AFDC program were instituted at the same time, as follows:
C Elimination of the 100-hour per month work limitation on AFDC-UP recipients. The 100-hour rule continues to apply for initial eligibility determination. Effective December 1992 for treatment cases.
C AFDC recipients may be exempt from participation in GAIN (Greater Avenues for Independence, California's welfare-to-work training program) if they have a child younger than three years old, but this exemption may only be used once. Applicable to treatments beginning April 1994.
C Changes in the asset limits for treatment cases: equity value of an automobile increased from $1500 to $4500, allowable resources increased from $1000 to $2000, and savings accounts up to $5000 for specialized purposes such as children's college education, down-payment on homes, or for starting a business. Effective April 1994. Old asset tests still apply at the time of eligibility determination.
C Treatment cases may elect to not receive an aid check but continue to receive only Medicaid coverage and child care assistance. Effective May 1994.
C For treatment cases, the need standard was increased July 1993 and July 1994. This tended to 14 increase benefit payments, although payments for cases with zero income would receive only the maximum benefit. Table 2 describes the correlation between marital status in the two survey waves. All statistics and regressions in this paper are weighted, using sample weights that weight the sample up to the caseload population in the four counties.
The fact that randomization was executed properly in this experiment is documented in Becerra et al. (1996) . In addition, randomization applies to the subsample in the telephone survey: a probit regression of control/treatment status on all of the exogenous right-hand side variables used in my analysis shows no significant correlation, either for Wave 1 or Wave 2. (These results are available from the author.)
IV. Empirical Results
This section of the paper is divided into subsections that in turn deal with the following questions: (A) what was the effect of the California welfare experiment on marriage rates, (B) what explains differences between transitions into marriage and transitions out of marriage, and (C) do marriage and cohabitation respond in predictable ways. An examination of whether non-random attrition biases the estimates is presented in the Appendix.
A. Experimental impacts on marriage rates
The simple experimental impacts on marital status can be measured by comparing rates of marriage/cohabitation between the control and treatment groups. Table 3 Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table 3 .
16
-12- The tabulations in Table 3 show a statistically significant difference only in Wave 2, and only for women initially drawn from the AFDC-UP caseload. Women in the control group (higher benefits and higher benefit reduction rates) were less likely to be married or cohabiting than women in the treatment group. The bottom panel of the table shows the treatment effect after controlling for demographic variables (via ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression): those results are the same as the raw differences. In addition to being statistically significant, the effects are also large in economic 16 terms: for AFDC-UP women in Wave 2, there was a control-treatment difference of more than 7
percentage points in marriage rates. Thus, the welfare program incentives under the experiment had sizeable and statistically significant effects on marriage behavior.
A further finding is that the AFDC-Basic estimates argue against a large effect on marriage in that population. With a point estimate of 0.0192 and a standard error of 0.0258, a treatment effect larger than 0.0616 can be ruled out with a one-tailed test. If all of this treatment effect were attributable to changes in the benefit level rather than the benefit reduction rate (or other components of the treatment),
This conversion uses the fact that the treatment-control difference in the maximum benefit for a family of 17 four is $65 per month, so 0.0948=0.0616*100/65.
There are no significant differences between control and treatment groups in their dates of Wave 1 or Wave 18 2 interviews. The regression-adjusted differences also control for month of interview.
-13-then this suggests that a $100 decrease in the benefit level for a family of four would have smaller than a 0.0948 effect on marriage.
17
The tabulations are performed separately for Wave 1 and Wave 2 because the treatment effects may change with the length of the experiment. One might expect very little response in Wave 1 because this survey occurs between 10 and 21 months after the start of the experiment-a short time to measure differences in the occurrence of rare events such as marriage or divorce. In contrast, Wave 2 interviews take place between 29 and 41 months after the start of the experiment. The comparison of estimates 18 from Wave 1 and Wave 2 in Table 3 shows that the welfare effects grow larger over time, particularly for women initially on AFDC-UP. The fact that the effects change at all between two waves of the survey may seem surprising. However, an examination of the transitions in Appendix Table 2 shows that the AFDC population experiences considerable change in marital status over a relatively short time span: nearly 20 percent of the women (among those who don't attrit from the sample) have a change in marital status. Thus, it is not surprising to find an effect between Wave 1 and Wave 2. The fact that the effect becomes larger over time may simply reflect that as time goes on, more women undergo marital transitions and hence understand the incentives. The distinction between marital formation among AFDC-Basic women and marital dissolution among AFDC-UP women is explored in the next section.
B. Marital formation versus marital dissolution
Why is the experimental response so much stronger for AFDC-UP women than for AFDC-Basic women? First, note that 49 percent of AFDC-Basic women had never been married as of Wave 1, whereas all AFDC-UP women were by definition either married or cohabiting as of the beginning of the Since the EDD data do not provide sufficiently accurate information to identify which male is the male 19 spouse, I add earnings of all males in each AFDC case. No significant earnings differences between the control and experimental groups are found. It is important to note that this figure refers only to the 60 percent of AFDC-UP cases that have matches with EDD earnings records. Factors that significantly raise the likelihood of a case having no matching male earnings data include young age, low education, whether Hispanic, residence in Alameda or Los Angeles counties, and short durations on AFDC prior to the experiment. There is no difference between controls and experimentals in whether they have EDD matches.
At the same time, women's earnings are also likely to grow over time and make them less likely to be eligible 20 for AFDC-Basic benefits.
-14-experiment. It is reasonable to suppose that women who have little option for marriage do not respond to benefit incentives. AFDC-UP women may simply find it easier to move out of marriage than AFDCBasic women can move into marriage, because beginning a marriage is a result of two people's decisions while marriage may be ended unilaterally.
It is natural to ask why the marriage effect grows stronger over time mainly for AFDC-UP women. Note first that the earnings of male partners of women initially on AFDC-UP are by definition low enough to qualify for benefits. Yet, as time passes, one might expect these male earnings to rise to the point where some fraction of these couples would become ineligible for benefits if they were to stay together. If this effect is large enough, then AFDC-UP effectively ceases to become an option for many women over time, and the attraction of higher benefits (for control group women) in AFDC-Basic in turn causes a higher divorce rate in the control group. The regressions described are performed for those women still on some kind of AFDC as of Wave 1. This 22 is done to ignore those women starting on AFDC-Basic at the start of the experiment who leave the program due to marriage by Wave 1. The treatment effect (between Wave 1 and Wave 2) for these women would not reflect the treatment effect that should apply to married AFDC recipients.
-15-on AFDC-Basic, the effect on marriage does not change much over time perhaps because their (potential) male partners need not have had low incomes when the women were selected into the sample (and hence these men experience little earnings growth, unlike the male partners of the initially AFDC-UP women).
21
Finally, to provide a further test of the interpretations offered here, one can categorize women according to Wave 1 marital status, instead of by the AFDC program in which they were enrolled at the start of the experiment. These regressions yield similar patterns (ignoring the difficult interpretation when stratifying on a lagged endogenous variable). The treatment effect on marriage in Wave 2 is significant and positive for those who had a Wave 1 spouse, and insignificant and small for those without a Wave 1 spouse. Moreover, the magnitude of the probability derivative for those married in Wave 1 is nearly identical to the effect reported in Table 3 for AFDC-UP women. (These results are available from the author. ) Thus, the experimental effects seem to reflect effects on marital dissolution, rather 22 than effects for a peculiar population of AFDC-UP recipients.
C. Marriage versus cohabitation
The regressions reported so far combine marriage and cohabitation into one choice. We may be concerned about the distinction between these two alternatives to the extent that marriage might represent a deeper commitment and thus be better for the children's well-being in the long run, or to the extent that married couples share their economic resources differently from cohabiting couples (where this sharing might ultimately have consequences for expenditures on children). Table 4 reports results A similar conclusion can be reached by examining the transitions in Appendix Table 2C .
23
-16-from multinomial logits in which the three choices are marriage, cohabitation, and female headship.
Other regressors in these equations are identical to those reported in Appendix Table 3; their coefficients are not reported for brevity. Recall that the only significant effect from Table 3 was for AFDC-UP women in Wave 2. In this case, the effect comes mostly through changes in marital status rather than changes in cohabitation relationships. (This result is the same if one estimates two separate probits with the dependent variables being binary indicators of marriage and cohabitation, respectively.) Thus, it appears that welfare incentives have more of an effect on longer-term commitments through marriage rather than on choices of living arrangements alone. Most of the welfare-induced transitions in the AFDC-UP population occur between marriage and female headship.
Inspection of Table 1 demonstrates that a woman faces strong disincentives to marrying a male who is not the father of her children. If the male has significant earnings, then the AFDC payment may be reduced to zero under marriage; in contrast, the woman if she cohabits with the male would still be eligible for AFDC-Basic benefits.
In order to determine whether the choice between marriage and cohabitation responds to these welfare incentives, I estimated a multinomial logit where the choices are (i) female headship, (ii) cohabit with a non-parent male, (iii) cohabit with a parent male, (iv) marry a non-parent male, and (v) marry a -17-parent male. Among women in the survey sample selected from the AFDC-UP population, only a handful ever chose to cohabit with or marry a non-parent male, so I restrict the sample for this logit model to those women initially from the AFDC-Basic population. In order to conserve degrees of freedom, the only regressor in this logit is the treatment dummy variable. Adding other regressors does not affect the coefficient, since the treatment was randomly assigned and hence orthogonal to other potential variables. Table 5 below reports actual and predicted probabilities and probability derivatives. Note: dP/dT is the mean derivative of the probability with respect to the experimental treatment.
The first thing to note from Table 5 is that women are very unlikely to choose to marry males who are not parents of the women's children. The probability of choice (iv) relative to choice (ii) is much less than the probability of choice (v) relative to choice (iii). This rarity is in itself consistent with the incentives I have described. For either parents or non-parents, there is no consistent effect of the treatment on the likelihood of marriage relative to cohabitation. (The only statistically significant effect is for choice (iii) in Wave 2.) The fact that there is for the most part no response may not be surprising, since the disincentives even before a change in benefits are so strong. The extra disincentive caused by, say, an increase in the maximum benefit level is only a small fraction of the total disincentive to be married or cohabit. Another reason the data do not show strong treatment effects here is that a woman may not accurately report cohabitation and parental status of the male to the welfare agency.
V. Discussion and Conclusions
See Hu (1998) for an extended discussion of results that are suggestive of the treatment effect being 24 attributable to the benefit level change.
-18-I have presented evidence that AFDC's incentives relating to marriage and cohabitation have large and statistically significant effects on poor women's behavior. The variation in marriage incentives arises from a randomized social experiment rather than from policy decisions taken by different states at different times to change their benefit levels; thus, my inferences are not confounded by simultaneous changes across states in other policies or economic factors affecting marriage. The effects of changing benefit incentives are larger the longer a woman is exposed to a different benefit regime and primarily operate for initially married women in the AFDC-UP caseload. These women represent a small proportion of the overall AFDC caseload. In California, AFDC-UP cases comprised 18 percent of the average monthly caseload and 21 percent of total benefit payments in 1995 (U.S. House of Representatives, 1996) . In the U.S., AFDC-UP cases represented 7 percent of the average monthly caseload and 10 percent of benefit expenditures in 1995. An important caveat is that these results do not necessarily measure the long-run, steady-state effect of the treatment on marriage rates. However, the fact that effects are empirically significant after 3½ years suggests that long-run effects may exist-a finding that previous studies have not been able to support or reject.
Another limitation of the current study is that the treatment was multi-faceted. While one cannot isolate the effects of changes maximum benefit levels, the evidence that any package of incentives does 24 affect marriage is significant.
A potentially important component of AFDC's total incentive effects on marriage that is not measured here is that higher benefits may lead women to become single mothers in order to get onto the caseload in the first place (see Moffitt (1992) for a fuller discussion of entry effects). The existence of the AFDC program may have bigger incentive effects than moderate changes in benefit levels (Murray 1984) . This study's results do not necessarily indicate that AFDC-UP failed to encourage marriage in the low-income population. After all, much of the initial population of AFDC-UP couples may have been divorced had it not been for the availability of AFDC-UP benefits. Thus, AFDC-UP may have an entry effect that encourages marriage, but conditional on being in the program, marriage is discouraged if benefits in both AFDC programs are increased.
How should states use their new freedom to reform their welfare programs in light of these findings? The AFDC-UP program was originally mandated for all states partly due to a desire to reduce the marriage disincentive of AFDC-Basic. Until the 1996 welfare reform, benefit levels in the two programs were identical. It is not difficult to see that the incentive to be married could be increased by raising AFDC-UP benefit levels relative to AFDC-Basic benefit levels. We can also consider benefit levels as only one measure of welfare's "generosity" in a general sense. For example, tightening work requirements or imposing tighter time limits on single parents relative to two-parent recipient families may have important marriage-encouraging effects. In this way, the 1996 welfare reform may already have decreased the incentive to divorce, even without a change in benefit levels.
Policymakers also need to address the question of whether marriage is always a desirable outcome in the low-income population. Some studies (see McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994 for an example and references) suggest that children who grow up in single-parent families are likely to have worse outcomes in terms of school completion rates, teen childbearing, and "idleness" (neither being in school nor working). McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) also suggest that these outcomes are not due purely to a loss in income. Thus, a policy conundrum arises: how can the state provide income support to children in low-income families without greatly increasing the risk of losing a parent through divorce or delayed marriage? Of course, it is not necessarily the case that losing a parent will always harm the children: there are some cases in which a father or step-father may be a negative influence upon a child or may be abusive of the child. The prevalence of this situation among welfare recipient families is not well understood, nor is it known whether the negative effect of having a single parent is stronger or weaker at low levels of income. A plausible argument can be made that women who respond the most -20-to benefit incentives against marriage are those women with the least attractive male partners, and that these male partners are not always good parents. This study's finding of an effect of welfare on marriage bolsters the case for pursuing further research on marriage's effects on well-being.
The choice of interviewer dummies to include was determined as follows: First, I estimated an independent 25 probit determining whether a woman stays in the sample, including all 19 interviewer dummies on the right-hand side. I then aggregated interviewers with similar coefficients and re-estimated the probit. I then dropped those variables that had estimated coefficients with p-values greater than 0.20 and used the remaining variables in the joint selection model.
-23-
Appendix
Survey attrition between Wave 1 and Wave 2 for AFDC-Basic and AFDC-UP women was 21
and 19 percent, respectively. I assess the importance of bias resulting from potential non-random attrition by estimating a sample selection model, described by: with respondents' decisions to remain in the survey for a second-round interview but are plausibly uncorrelated with Wave 2 marriage decisions and hence are excludable from X .
2
Full-information maximum-likelihood results for this selection model are presented in Appendix   Table 5 . The predicted change in the probability of having a spouse or partner due to the experimental The use of interviewer dummies may not be valid if particular interviewers were assigned to hard-to-27 interview cases. The design of the welfare survey was such that each respondent was initially assigned an interviewer at random; interviewers could be reassigned if a case proved to be difficult to reach. However, the dataset only indicates the interviewer who completed the interview; thus, there could be a correlation between interviewer and the respondent's desire to undergo an interview. In order to examine this possibility, I estimated probits of the selection equation only on the sample of respondents who completed the interview the first time they were contacted. For this sample, the estimated effects of the interviewer dummies on the probability of attrition were usually very similar to the estimated magnitudes in the full sample. (The exception was interviewer 4, which was therefore omitted from the full selection model.) Thus, while it is not ideal to include potentially endogenous interview dummies, there does not seem to be a significant problem with doing so.
A countervailing effect, which I ignore here for the sake of argument, is that the treatment group has lower 28 benefit levels and thus might be more likely to leave welfare than the control group.
I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this problem. A second potential attrition-related problem occurs if attrition is related to subsequent welfare recipiency. Suppose as an extreme case all of the survey attriters are AFDC-UP women who stay married but leave welfare due to ineligibility over time. Also recall that the treatment group is exempt from the 100-hour rule, so that couples in this group may be more likely to stay on welfare than women in the control group. Then, assuming the experiment has no true effect on divorce rates, the marriage 28 rate (number married and on AFDC divided by the sum of (number married and on AFDC plus number divorced)) for the treatment group will be higher than for the control group because a greater fraction of those who are married stay in the survey among the treatment group.
29
I have chosen not to incorporate welfare participation in the formal attrition selection model because of its 30 endogeneity.
-25- 
